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Taking the necessary 
tough decisions 
Developments in the eurozone this past 
couple of weeks had us all sitting on the 
edge of our seats. But commitment to 
the euro and European perseverance to 
exit the crisis ensured that an agreement 
was reached on a financial assistance 
programme for Cyprus to help the 
Cypriot people rebuild their economy. 
To support these efforts, President 
Barroso – with President Anastasiades’ 
consent – announced the creation of a 
Commission Task Force for Cyprus, 
which will provide technical assistance to 
the Cypriot authorities, with a strong 
focus on employment, competitiveness 
and growth. 
The question of competitiveness was also 
at the centre of discussions at the last 
European Council – which this issue of 
the BEPA Monthly Brief (BMB) mainly 
examines. The Council pointed out that 
improving competitiveness will increase 
growth and jobs, and can be a means for 
driving prosperity and sustaining 
European living standards. In response 
to the financial crisis, the European 
Commission has acted decisively through 
a number of initiatives to restore the 
stability of the financial system. Its 
reform agenda has been broad. While it 
has particularly focussed on the banking 
sector, which has been at the epicentre of 
the crisis and in need for urgent reforms, 
as events in Cyprus reminded us, it has 
also aimed at tackling the social 
implications of the crisis. In this context, 
the Commission has acted to support job 
opportunities for young people and to 
help SMEs access finance, initiatives 
which need to be deployed on the 
ground quickly.  
On a another note, Russia, a key strategic 
partner for the EU, also featured in the 
discussions of EU leaders. It was 
followed on 21-22 March by the 
executive-to-executive talks in Moscow 
between the European Commission, led 
by President Barroso, and the Russian 
government, led by Prime Minister 
Medvedev, in an effort to move from a 
relation of opportunity to a ‘partnership 
of choice’. A wide range of topics was 
discussed, from trade to transport, from 
energy to mobility, from science to good 
governance and the rule of law. Particular 
highlights included trade as one of the 
pillars of EU-Russia cooperation and the 
adoption of the EU-Russia Roadmap for 
Energy Cooperation until 2050. In light 
of these meetings, the BMB presents two 
complementary points of view on EU-
Russia relations – one from Russia and 
one from the EU – analysing the deep 
changes of a ‘stirring Russia’ and the 
potential as well as openings for 
engagement with this important 
neighbour. 
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Competitiveness is the key to exiting the 
crisis and building sustainable growth 
Few economic concepts are talked about this 
much and at the same time this loosely defined. 
We all seem to roughly understand what 
competitiveness is, while this notion is not 
defined precisely in economics and business 
handbooks. Is it another case of “I recognise it 
when I see it”?  
When one actually looks deeper into the 
meaning of “competitiveness”, one rapidly 
discovers how crucial competitiveness is for 
European sustainable growth, for the resolution 
of the crisis, as well as for our living standards 
and social model. Competitiveness is often used 
to talk about “external competitiveness”, that is, 
the ability of European businesses to sell their 
goods abroad (exports) and fend off external 
competition on the domestic market (imports). 
Alternatively, competitiveness is often used as a 
synonym of or the key driver for growth.  
These notions are quite different, but strikingly 
they have one major well-defined component in 
common: productivity. Productivity is the 
ability to do more and better with less. As such, 
it is the most virtuous source of growth: it does 
not rely on increased debt and has sustainability, 
which refers to higher resource efficiency, 
embedded into it. Moreover, the more 
productive a person, a business or an economy 
is, the higher their income and wages can be. 
Therefore productivity refers to how Europe 
can maintain its living standards and social 
model, while facing heightened competition 
from new international low-wage competitors 
such as China, India, Brazil and Russia. 
Europe’s answer must be to increase its 
productivity, not to lower its wages. Europe can 
maintain its competitiveness if it increases its 
productivity while maintaining high relative 
wages. 
The European Union already has a strategy to 
boost productivity: the Europe 2020 agenda. 
Indeed, productivity is the result of innovation 
in products, services, new production processes, 
game-changing business models, investments in 
machines, research and infrastructure, new 
technologies, education and skills, to name a 
few. All these elements are at the heart of the 
Europe 2020 agenda. 
Europe’s apparent strong competitiveness 
hides uneven and weakening performance 
Europe includes globally competitive 
economies and businesses. For instance, five of 
the top eight countries in the latest World 
Economic Forum Global Competitiveness 
Index are EU member states and others from 
outside the EU but within the European space. 
The “2012 Fortune global 500” companies 
count 148 European-based firms (i.e. 29 per 
cent) against 146 based in the United States. 
The EU’s share of global companies has been 
stable over the last decade. 
Moreover, immediately prior to the crisis, some 
aspects of Europe’s competitiveness were 
improving contrary to conventional wisdom. 
For example, the growth of GDP per capita 
between 2000 and 2008 even in “old” Europe 
(EU15) was greater than that of the US, creating 
over 3 million jobs more than in the US during 
this period. This situation flowed from the 
benefits of ambitious structural reforms that 
some EU member states had undertaken, and 
which are analysed later in this article.  
The reality, however, is that Europe’s aggregate 
and average performances masked a very 
uneven performance and ultimately a more 
generalised loss of competitiveness. First, 
performance is very uneven from one EU 
member state to another. While half of the top-
10 countries in the World Economic Forum 
competitiveness ranking are EU member states, 
as noted above, eight are ranked below 50, that 
is, below countries like Indonesia, South Africa, 
and Mexico. Inside the Union, our best 
performing member states are twice as 
1 A renewed partnership for European competitiveness 
By Baudouin Regout*  
* Baudouin Regout is an Adviser in the Analysis Team in BEPA. 
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productive as the worst performing. Secondly 
and more broadly, Europe’s productivity 
growth has slowed down, especially when 
compared to global competitors such as the 
United States or China. Europe has faced a 
drop in innovation and a host of indicators have 
taken a downturn, similar to the needle on a 
barometer before a storm. EU productivity is 
now 25 per cent lower than US productivity. 
EU global companies represent only 21 per cent 
in market value as compared to 41 per cent in 
market value for US companies, reflecting their 
relatively smaller size and lower growth 
prospects. Among the “Forbes 25 most 
innovative companies”, 17 (56 per cent) 
companies are based in the USA, four in China, 
three in India, and only three in Europe (12 per 
cent). 
Europe’s economy, social model and place 
in the world cannot afford lower and uneven 
competitiveness  
Not only is this weakening and uneven 
competitiveness a terrifying missed opportunity 
in terms of growth and jobs, but it has also 
been a significant contributor to the emergence 
of the sovereign debt crisis facing the euro area. 
The need to exit the crisis, combat 
unemployment, reform our economies, reduce 
debt and ensure future growth is already a 
major task. But the long-term systemic 
challenges confronting Europe render stronger 
competitiveness and productivity even more 
necessary. Europe must deal with its aging 
population, increasing energy costs, the rise of 
global competitors, and the impact of climate 
change, to name but four of the most pressing 
issues.  
Europe has proven it can boost its 
competitiveness, but needs a renewed 
relationship between the EU and its 
member states 
Faced with a challenge of this magnitude we can 
draw comfort from the fact that recent 
experience has shown that Europe can boost its 
competitiveness by engaging in structural 
reforms and learning from each other. Before 
the crisis, we saw that some member states – 
Germany, but also the Netherlands, and across 
Scandinavia, and to some extent in Spain and 
Italy – implemented fundamental reforms and 
reaped the benefits. To give just one example: 
as a result of reforms in the education system 
and the labour market, youth unemployment in 
the Netherlands fell by 34 per cent between 
2004 and 2008.  
Since the crisis, we have seen a credible 
commitment to fundamental reforms and the 
impact is starting to show, notably in the 
spectacular improvement of the trade balances 
of Ireland, Spain and Portugal, for instance. 
However, to successfully implement the 
reforms we need a different Europe, a new type 
of relationship between the Union and its 
member states – and also between the EU and 
its citizens.  
Many benefits can still be gained from the 
Single Market and closer economic integration, 
but these will increasingly depend on actions 
taken by the member states rather than 
regulation agreed upon in Brussels. This can be 
achieved, for example, by making the local 
service sector more competitive or improving 
the local regulation for network industries (e.g. 
broadband). We have seen the boost that better 
regulation of the retail sector has brought to the 
Swedish economy, and the broader value of the 
liberalisation of the taxi market in Dublin.  
There are also a host of other measures that can 
be taken in labour markets, pensions, public 
administration reform and education – to name 
but a few sectors – where real advantages will 
come about only if reform is undertaken by 
member states in cooperation with and with the 
support of the EU. Through this partnership, 
competitiveness will be identified and reforms 
that are specific to and right for each country 
will be boosted. The enhanced system of 
EU economic governance provides the way 
towards such a new model. The increase in 
powers, however, will also need to ensure an 
increase in accountability. For this reason, the 
Blueprint for the deepening of economic and 
monetary union, which the European 
Commission adopted last year, identifies the 
need to move towards a political union in 
parallel to full economic and monetary union. 
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The EU’s Russia policy requires a rethink. It 
should take account of the changes in Russia 
under way since late 2011. These changes 
include: a fledging multi-directional societal 
awakening after two decades of post-
communist/post-imperial readjustment; a shift 
toward social conservatism in the government’s 
policies; and an emphasis on Eurasian 
integration as the main thrust of Russia’s foreign 
policy. Europeans need to understand these 
changes and their implications to ensure that the 
EU has a successful policy toward its biggest 
neighbour. Above all, Europeans need not be 
frustrated by the vicissitudes of Russian domestic 
developments and should take instead a long-
term view.  
State responses to a stirring Russia 
The Russian awakening is the result of Russian 
society’s relative success in first surviving amid 
the debris of the Soviet system without slipping 
into a civil war, and then in achieving a measure 
of freedom and prosperity never enjoyed before 
in Russian history. Socio-political – rather than 
purely economic – development are likely to play 
the leading role in Russia’s future evolution. The 
stirring of society should not be mistaken for a 
‘Russian Spring’, much less for the death knell of 
the existing regime. The awakening covers the 
entire waterfront: from liberals and libertarians 
to nationalists and fundamentalists. Much of it 
has no political or ideological affiliation; some of 
it is distinctly religious, whether Christian 
Orthodox or Islamic. Russia is stirring, but not 
yet moving. 
The Russian government has responded to the 
society’s awakening with a combination of token 
concessions, targeted repression, and a clear 
conservative shift. So far, the Russian 
government has been able to repel the challenge 
from its opponents. However, the Kremlin has 
taken the threat to its rule seriously. In response 
to the potentially lethal charge of wholesale 
corruption in high places it has ordered 
investigations of high-level cases on the 
embezzlement of state funds. It is also in the 
process of disciplining echelons of the elite, 
restricting, for example, their freedom to keep 
their money abroad. 
The authorities have also come up with a version 
of Russian official nationalism grounded in 
Orthodox Christianity and the traditional values 
that it supports (e.g., the sanctity of traditional 
family and respect for authority). The Russian 
Orthodox Church has already become an overt 
partner of the Russian state. The state itself is 
represented by a strong centralised leadership 
which rules with the consent of the majority. It is 
legitimised through elections, where opposition 
is depicted as anti-national: either Communist or 
pro-United States. The unity of the bulk of the 
Russian people in this scheme of things is 
necessary for Russia to escape being subjugated 
by foreigners, particularly the United States.  
The shape of a Russia to come 
The reality of the Russian awakening means, 
however, that interests are increasingly entering 
the public debate challenging the official scheme. 
The Kremlin has vast resources and much 
resilience in the face of the continuing change, 
but the next few years are likely to be anything 
but dull. Barring unforeseen developments, 
elections will drive the political process. By the 
time Russians are due to elect their new Duma 
(2016) and take part in another presidential vote 
(2018), in which Putin intends to present himself 
again, society will have evolved. Russia will be 
more interesting, but is unlikely to become 
overly chaotic: for most people, too much is at 
stake. 
As an international player, Russia sees itself as a 
great power. This means that Russia does not 
accept much control over others; rather it seeks 
freedom from anyone else’s control. Russia’s 
new official nationalism has a distinct anti-
American flavour. Moscow’s relations with 
Washington are at a low ebb, even in the absence 
of a significant clash of interests. The global 
recession and the eurozone crisis have pushed 
2 Responding to the Russian awakening 
By Dmitri Trenin* 
* Dmitri Trenin is the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.  
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Moscow toward more emphasis on Eurasian 
regionalism. Since 2009, Moscow has been 
prioritising integration with Belarus and 
Kazakhstan within a customs union and then a 
single economic space, leading to a full-fledged 
economic union by 2015. From a geopolitical 
perspective, Russia seeks to strengthen its 
position vis-à-vis its main neighbours: the EU 
and China. While choosing to see the relative 
decline of the West as a welcome sign of global 
power rebalancing, Russia is trying to adjust to 
the rise of Asia and especially that of its 
neighbour, China. Moscow has been trying – so 
far, not with much success – to find a formula to 
launch the economic revival of its Siberian and 
Far Eastern regions.  
Engaging with Russia 
For the outside world, dealing with Russia in the 
next few years will mean dealing directly with 
President Putin. Many will find this situation 
unpleasant and call for actively opposing the 
Kremlin’s authoritarianism. Following the US 
Congressional example, some Europeans are 
calling for adopting Europe’s own versions of 
the Magnitsky Act, thus applying real pressure on 
the people who rule Russia and their allies.  
Yet, opposing Russia, or simply ignoring it, will 
carry a price. Russia is, and will continue to be, 
for the Russians themselves to fix. Russia is not 
part of the EU Brussels-leaning neighbourhood, 
where conditionality can be effectively employed. 
Outsiders can influence Russian developments 
only on the margins, and not always positively. 
Western values need to inform Western interests, 
not to replace them. Europeans need to 
approach the Russians on their own terms, but 
they should not expect the Russians always to 
conform. Unlike the EU approach practiced 
toward Turkey and Ukraine, the issue for the EU 
should not be what the Europeans want Russia 
to be or to become, but what they want or need 
from Russia. The basic needs include: 
 ensuring peace and stability on the continent 
of Europe, where the EU and Russia are the 
biggest units; 
 expanding and deepening trade while avoiding 
EU overdependence on Russian energy 
supplies; 
 exploiting investment opportunities in Russia, 
as the Russian investment climate warms up; 
 broadening and thickening humanitarian 
contacts between EU and Russians citizens; 
 achieving greater harmony of values, norms 
and principles between the EU and Russia. 
That said, more European engagement with 
Russians at all levels and in all fields (economy 
and business, culture and the arts, tourism and 
exchange programmes) will materially contribute 
to Russian society’s onward transformation, 
including in the realm of values. Isolationist 
trends in the Kremlin’s policies can be effectively 
countered by opening Europe even more widely 
to Russian citizens. Phasing out visa restrictions 
is the most effective way for the EU to use its 
soft power with respect to Russia. 
Europe’s soft power will increase still further 
when the EU emerges from the present financial 
crisis and re-launches growth. As it strives for 
more internal coherence, the Union should avoid 
its Russia policy being the lowest common 
denominator of national attitudes. It should also 
avoid a situation where the EU appears in the 
Russian eyes to stand for restrictions, while the 
bilateral relationships with individual EU 
member states seem to offer opportunities.  
Finally, Europe should not succumb to the new 
stereotype that Russia will become increasingly 
irrelevant in the 21st century world and simply 
lose interest. If Russia continues to decline, its 
problems may seriously affect Europe. If it 
eventually emerges as a more important player, 
Europe will have missed important 
opportunities. That said, Europeans need to pay 
close attention, and seek to use their soft power 
to build a special relationship with their 
neighbour. Putin’s vision of a “greater Europe” 
as a compact between the EU and the yet-to-
emerge Eurasian Union should challenge the 
Europeans to come up with a vision of their 
own. 
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En matière de relations étrangères, les relations 
UE-Russie bénéficient en ce début d’année 2013 
d’un calendrier particulièrement chargé. Outre 
les deux sommets semestriels de décembre 2012 
et de juin 2013, la rencontre bisannuelle du 
collège et du gouvernement russe s’est tenue le 
22 mars à Moscou, avec pas moins de 
15 commissaires qui ont fait le déplacement. 
Cette visite intervenait quelques jours après une 
série d’échanges de vues avec les Etats membres 
sur les relations UE-Russie dont le point d’orgue 
a été une discussion du sein du Conseil européen 
des 14-15 mars derniers. 
Cette actualité dense est l’occasion de faire le 
point sur des relations riches et complexes, qui, 
comme l’a rappelé récemment le Président 
Barroso dans son discours prononcé le 21 mars 
dernier à une conférence à Moscou, nécessitent 
d’être régulièrement nourries et renouvelées. 
Etat des lieux 
Force est de constater tout d’abord la vigueur de 
relations commerciales bilatérales dont le 
dynamisme a déjà surmonté la crise financière. 
L’UE reste le partenaire commercial principal de 
la Russie qui est elle-même le troisième 
partenaire de l’UE. En 2012, les échanges 
bilatéraux sont montés à 336 milliard d’euros, 
près d’un milliard par jour. Il y a plus 
d’investissements européens en Russie qu’en 
Chine et en Inde réunis. Ces investissements, 
120 milliards d’euros, représentent 75 pour cent 
des investissements étrangers en Russie. Ces 
échanges restent toutefois très asymétriques, 
avec un poids dominant des exportations 
énergétiques russes et des importations qui pour 
l’essentiel sont des produits industriels 
transformés. 80 pour cent des exportations de 
pétrole, 70 pour cent des exportations de gaz et 
50 pour cent des exportations de charbon russes 
sont destinées au marché européen. A l’inverse, 
les produits manufacturés représentent plus de 
80 pour cent des exportations européennes. 
Enfin, la vigueur de nos relations concerne 
également les mouvements de personnes: la 
Russie est, de très loin, le pays auquel l’UE 
octroie le plus de visas, plus de 5,2 millions en 
2012, soit plus de 14.000 chaque jour. 
L’année 2012 a été aussi marquée par la volonté 
de la Russie de jouer tout son rôle dans le 
système multilatéral. A cet égard, l’adhésion 
formelle de la Russie à l’OMC – après 18 ans de 
négociations difficiles est un véritable game 
changer. Outre le fait que cette adhésion renforce 
indéniablement le système multilatéral, elle va 
permettre le développement des échanges, grâce 
à une réduction du tarif moyen appliqué par la 
Russie à 7,8 pour cent, soit près de 2 pour cent 
de moins que la Chine, selon l’OMC (2012), et 
grâce aux engagements pris dans 11 secteurs de 
services. La prise en charge de la présidence du 
G20 (puis du G8 l’an prochain) illustre la volonté 
du gouvernement russe de faire preuve de 
leadership pour favoriser l’émergence de 
solutions aux défis globaux actuels, que ce soit 
en matière de lutte contre le protectionnisme, de 
réforme du système financier, de politique 
énergétique durable ou d’agenda pour renforcer 
la croissance mondiale.  
Enfin, l’Europe reste le partenaire privilégié de la 
Russie pour la modernisation de son économie. 
Des progrès significatifs ont été possibles dans le 
domaine du partenariat pour la modernisation, 
qui comporte plus de 300 projets avec à la clé 
une contribution financière européenne de 
60 millions d’euros et un prêt de 200 millions de 
la BEI pour l’internationalisation des PME. La 
coopération dans le domaine des sciences et des 
technologies est aussi au cœur de notre relation 
comme l’atteste la décision de l’UE et de la 
Russie de déclarer l’année 2014 « année de la 
science ». Même dans le domaine réputé difficile 
des relations en matière d’énergie, l’accord récent 
sur la feuille de route conjointe pour l’énergie 
d’ici 2050, montre que l’UE et la Russie peuvent 
se doter d’une vision commune de long terme. 
Malgré ces succès et d’autres à venir notamment 
dans le domaine de la sécurité, l’UE et la Russie 
ne sont pas encore parvenues à hisser leur 
partenariat à un niveau permettant de réaliser 
tout le potentiel culturel, politique et 
3 La relation UE-Russie : un nouveau souffle ? 
Par Eric Peters* 
* Eric Peters est Conseiller au sein de l’équipe Analysis du BEPA. 
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économique de leur relation. Des efforts sont 
encore nécessaires pour réduire les divergences 
en matière de modèle énergétique ou pour 
adopter enfin un nouveau cadre de coopération 
commun, dont les négociations piétinent depuis 
plusieurs années. 
Un pas en avant 
Le Président Barroso a ouvert des pistes pour 
parvenir à le faire lors de sa visite des 21 et 
22 mars à Moscou : il faut faire de ce partenariat 
fondé sur la nécessité, un vrai choix réciproque. 
Ce choix doit s’appuyer sur le respect des 
engagements pris – que ce soit à l’OMC ou au 
sein du Conseil de l’Europe – et sur des objectifs 
bilatéraux concrets et pragmatiques de moyen 
terme. A ce titre, un nouveau cadre institutionnel 
global qui comprenne une dimension 
commerciale, énergétique et de facilitation des 
mouvements de personnes, est essentiel. 
La mise en œuvre d’une telle approche politique 
sera facilitée par un travail d’analyse des causes 
profondes qui expliquent les divergences 
actuelles. S’agissant d’une relation chargée 
d’émotions, il y a très certainement beaucoup à 
faire pour améliorer la manière dont chacun 
perçoit son partenaire. Si l’histoire commune est 
une richesse pour notre relation, elle pèse aussi 
par les visions du passé qu’elle fait émerger sous 
forme de clichés et de caricatures, que ce soit 
celui d’une Russie menaçante ou au contraire en 
perte de vitesse, d’une Europe prédatrice ou à 
l’inverse affaiblie par la crise. L’UE et la Russie 
ne pourront se tourner ensemble vers l’avenir 
qu’en développant une image plus juste de ce 
que chacun d’eux est vraiment dans ce 
XXIème siècle. Ce ne sera pas aisé, ne serait-ce 
parce que l’UE et la Russie sont soumises à des 
mutations profondes.  
L’avenir du partenariat UE-Russie 
C’est bien dans cette volonté de mieux 
comprendre notre partenaire russe que s’inscrit la 
quatrième édition du forum organisé 
conjointement par le BEPA et Carnegie Europe 
à Bruxelles, le 28 février dernier. Comme les 
éditions précédentes, ce forum a donné lieu à un 
échange de vues entre des représentants des 
institutions européennes et des experts 
rassemblés autour de l’équipe du Carnegie basés 
à Moscou sur l’évolution du contexte social et 
politique en Russie.  
Ce millésime 2012 a confirmé le diagnostique 
identifié lors de l’édition précédente d’un « réveil 
russe », et a permis d’en approfondir l’analyse et 
les conséquences, notamment sur les relations 
bilatérales. Un des faits les plus marquants est la 
volonté politique assumée par le gouvernement 
russe de faire émerger un « modèle russe », c’est-
à-dire d’un système de valeur et d’un mode 
d’organisation des forces politiques, sociales et 
économiques propres et distincts du modèle 
européen. Cette évolution est illustrée par le 
recentrage gouvernemental autour de valeurs 
conservatrices, voire nationalistes, et la volonté 
d’ériger la Russie en soft-power, organisant 
autour d’elle un pôle eurasien pour peser entre 
l’Europe et la Chine.  
Pour l’UE, cette possibilité d’une Russie qui 
assume durablement ses différences de valeur et 
d’organisation constitue un nouveau défi, en 
particulier à l’égard de notre objectif de 
promotion d’une société démocratique et d’une 
économie de marché ouverte. Devrait-elle 
conduire l’UE à revoir son approche comme le 
suggère Dmitri Trenin? Voilà une question qui 
ne manquera pas d’animer les débats à venir au 
sein de l’UE. 
En attendant, il pourra être utile de se rappeler 
deux faits simples. Premièrement, la nouvelle 
donne russe résulte d’abord d’une évolution 
endogène sur laquelle l’UE aura d’autant moins 
d’influence qu’elle ne présentera pas un modèle 
attractif. La priorité pour l’UE, y compris pour 
les relations avec la Russie, est une sortie de crise 
rapide. Deuxièmement, le renforcement des 
échanges commerciaux, des flux de services et 
d’investissement des mouvements de personnes 
est un puissant moteur de changement. Dans un 
contexte international complexe et incertain, 
c’est peut-être l’approche du pari pascalien qu’il 
conviendrait d’adopter. L’UE peut en effet faire 
le pari que toutes choses égales par ailleurs, c’est 
d’abord grâce à une circulation accrue des biens 
et des idées que le vent de réformes libérales 
pourra souffler un jour en Russie.  
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Walking a Thin Line: The role of think tanks 
in Arab transition and foreign support 
The author analyses EU efforts to find a balance 
between the necessary support for an emerging 
civil society in the Arab world and the avoidance of 
external interference. Many Arab think tanks were 
created following the ‘Arab spring’ and an 
“awakening of thought”. The author calls on Arab 
think tanks to: promote a culture of informed 
citizenship; convene exchanges between 
government officials and society; and advocate 
policy solutions. Since the ‘Arab spring’, the EU 
has put civil society at the centre of its policy 
towards the Middle East and North Africa. The 
author proposes to deepen this engagement by 
encouraging relations between political and social 
spheres, promoting regional Arab networks, and 
simplifying the bureaucracy associated with the 
Calls for Interest/Tenders for EU funding. 
h t t p : / / w w w . e u r o m e s c o . n e t / i n d e x . p h p ?
option=com_content&view=article&id=1823%3Abrief-51-
walking-a-fine-line-the-role-of-think-tanks-in-arab-transitions-and
- f o r e i g n - s u p p o r t & c a t i d = 6 2 % 3 A e u r o m e s c o -
briefs&Itemid=49&lang=fr 
The Shale Gas Boom: The global implications 
of the rise of unconventional fossil energy 
The switch from coal to shale gas in the US – and 
its subsequent boom – has led to significant US 
emission reductions. However, the global impact 
of shale gas is different: coal has become cheaper 
and long-term prices for oil could drop 
significantly with a substantial effect on climate 
policies. Cheap fossil fuels discourage investment 
in energy efficiency and render policies promoting 
renewables more expensive. The author advises the 
EU to restore the ability of the European 
Emissions Trading System to guide investments, 
setting adequate emission caps for the post-2020 
period to prevent a ‘coal renaissance’. The 
landscape of the global energy market is changing, 
shifting towards more competition and 
fragmentation: the importance of the Middle East 
may decline and Russian grip on gas markets 
weaken. 
http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/319/the_shale_gas_boom/ 
Scenarios for the Agricultural Sector in the 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean 
The EU is the most important trading partner for 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries 
(SEMC). However, the agricultural sector, 
employing a large part of the region’s population, 
was marginalised in the association agreements 
signed with the EU. Rather, selective protection was 
applied to individual SEMC producers. The author 
introduces four scenarios on the future agricultural 
performance in SEMCs: “business as usual” (the 
trend observed over the last two decades continues); 
“Mediterranean – one global player” and “the EU 
and SEMCs as regional players on the global 
stage” (production rises, imports and exports 
increase, and all value chains are absorbed); “the EU
-Mediterranean area under threat” (production, 
absorption and exports decrease, revenue 
performance and employment generation remain 
low, while imports continue to increase). 
http://www.ceps.eu/book/scenarios-agricultural-sector-southern
-and-eastern-mediterranean 
The Sixth EU-Brazil Summit: Business 
beyond the usual? 
The expected intensification of cooperation 
between Brazil and the EU following the signature 
of a strategic partnership in 2007 has not 
happened. A new positive spirit of cooperation and 
mutual trust emerged after the recently held  
6th EU-Brazil Summit in Brasilia, which aimed at 
assessing the current situation of the partnership 
and identifying possible areas for closer 
cooperation between the two partners. 
Consultations covered four areas: security issues; 
cooperation on development and governance; 
global economic governance; and trade and 
investment. The latter was largely dominated by the 
economic crisis. While cooperation is still 
advancing very slowly on a practical level, a very 
concrete outcome is the establishment of a high-
level dialogue on security matters, which provides 
the testing ground for closer coordination between 
the EU and Brazil. 
http://fride.org/publication/1106/the-sixth-eu-brazil-summit:
-business-beyond-the-usual 
4 Think Tank Twitter 
Think Tank Twitter (TTT) aims to provide regular information and updates on what is produced by think tanks and research centres across 
Europe (and beyond) on EU policy issues. As an analogy to the original Twitter, each summary – or tweet – does not exceed 140 words, rather 
than characters. Those who wish to signal new publications for possible inclusion can send them to the email address bepa-think-tank-
twitter@ec.europa.eu 
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The Baltic States’ Success Story in 
Combating the Economic Crisis: 
Consequences for regional cooperation 
within the EU and with Russia  
The global economic crisis has severely affected 
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The reason is 
primarily that the rather new and comparatively 
small EU member states depend largely on 
foreign direct investment and are thus very 
sensitive to external market changes. The three 
states decided to tackle the crisis through an 
internal devaluation strategy. These similar 
approaches have, however, had quite different 
results in the countries due to socio-political 
circumstances and the level of adaptability of the 
three states. Despite the different results, the 
cooperation amongst the Baltic states became 
closer and their links to Russia slightly stronger. 
Their pro-European conviction remains 
unchanged. Their anti-crisis strategy can be 
considered as a success as all of them have 
growing economies again. 
http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=13084  
The Migration-Development Nexus: Time 
for a paradigm shift 
The author argues that EU performance in the 
migration-development nexus is perceived 
critically, despite the EU’s recognition of the 
importance of the issue. The author holds that 
EU policy on external migration can neither 
offer a coherent approach to development nor 
an efficient approach to migration. Accordingly, 
she suggests that the EU reviews its priorities 
and shifts from a security-based approach to a 
rights-based approach. This concretely means 
addressing the issues that lead to illegal migration 
while supporting legal migration (e.g., more 
labour mobility in low-wage sectors). Human 
rights and asylum obligations need to be taken 
into consideration when cooperating with third 
countries. Circular migration streams must be 
acknowledged and the potential of diaspora 
communities utilised. The author recommends 
that the HR/VP and the EEAS play a stronger 





The Accessibility Act – Using the single 
market to promote fundamental rights 
The European Accessibility Act (forthcoming in 
the summer of 2013) aims at providing a 
growing number of disabled persons with 
accessible goods and services. For this 
undertaking to be successful, the author asks for 
a user centric and broad definition of 
accessibility within the act. Furthermore, the 
potential of the single market needs to be 
exploited. This is beneficial to both the 
completion of the single market and better 
accessibility to goods and services. As solutions 
to accessibility problems are also found in Asia 
and the US, the EU must act in a global context 
to benefit from these approaches. Accessibility 
requirements and standards should be 
developed, lowering costs but not hindering 
innovation. Finally and most crucial for success, 
the EU should raise awareness for disability 
issues among stakeholders. 
h t t p : / / w w w . e p c . e u / d o c u m e n t s / u p l o a d s /
pub_3393_the_accessibility_act.pdf 
Strengthening EU Presence in Global 
Financial Reform 
Numerous legislative initiatives have been 
undertaken to respond to the global financial 
crisis, most of which can be considered as soft 
law. Nonetheless, despite its immense market 
power, the EU struggles to influence 
international regulatory negotiations. To 
strengthen the EU’s regulatory capacity, the 
authors propose three measures: firstly, the EU 
should form a coherent position within the 
European Supervisory Authorities (ESA) and 
then represent this view in global financial 
regulatory negotiations. Second, the newly-
designed European banking supervisory 
authority must take into account the dimension 
of EU external representation in the global 
banking regulation. Finally, the traditional public-
private dichotomy needs to be overcome. 
Governance structures that complete the ESA 
should therefore be compatible with global 
financial regimes. 
h t t p : / / w w w . n o t r e - e u r o p e . e u / m e d i a /
globalfinancialregulation-katsikaschatzistavroutirkides-ne-jdi-
mar13.pdf 
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Le BEPA accueille deux nouvelles stagiaires à 
partir du 5 mars pour une période de 5 mois : 
Inês Russinho Mouga, diplômée d’un Master en 
sciences économiques fait partie de l’équipe 
Analysis, et Nathalie Spath, titulaire d’un 
diplôme en relations internationales intégrera 
l’équipe Outreach.  
Événements 
Le 5 mars, le BEPA a organisé un atelier portant 
sur le thème « Raising European Commission 
awareness for systemic risks and Global 
Resilience ». La conseillère scientifique en chef 
du Président Barroso, Anne Glover, a présidé 
l’événement. On comptait parmi les participants 
des chefs de cabinet, des directeurs généraux, et 
des représentants de grands conglomérats et 
d’ONG internationaux. L’événement visait à 
sensibiliser le public et le préparer en cas de 
perturbation du système socio-économique 
mondial. Les sujets abordés ont inclus des 
scénarios prospectifs, l’examen des conditions 
menant à une intervention d’urgence, et les 
prochaines étapes possibles. 
Le 7 mars, le Président Barroso a accueilli le 
Président israélien Peres pour un échange de 
vues sur les défis globaux auxquels l’Europe fait 
face. Cette réunion a permis un échange 
substantiel sur les relations entre l’UE et Israël, le 
processus de paix au Proche-Orient et les 
tendances mondiales de l’avenir. 
Le 8 mars, le site interinstitutionnel ESPAS 
(http://europa.eu/espas/) a été lancé. Il s’agit d’une 
première étape qui permettra le développement 
ultérieur, plus ambitieux encore, notamment la 
création d’un « global repository » rassemblant 
les principales études prospectives publiées dans 
le monde. 
Le 19 mars, le Groupe Européen d’Ethique 
(EGE) s’est réuni afin de continuer l’élaboration 
de son Avis sur les technologies de sécurité et de 
surveillance. 
Le 21 mars, le Groupe Inter-service sur l’Éthique 
– créé afin de faciliter l’échange d’information 
entre les services de la Commission qui 
travaillent sur des sujets ayant une dimension 
éthique – s’est réuni pour discuter l’Avis n° 27, 
récemment adopté, sur un cadre éthique pour 
accéder à la recherche, la production et 
l’utilisation de l’énergie. 
Activités à venir 
Le 10 avril, le STAC (Science and Technological 
Advisory Council) se réunira pour la deuxième 
fois. Le STAC est un groupe indépendant et 
informel composé d’experts en science et 
technologie provenant du milieu universitaire, de 
l’entreprise et de la société civile, couvrant un 
large éventail de sujets et réunissant l’expertise de 
tout l’espace européen de la recherche. L’objectif 
premier du STAC est de conseiller le Président 
Barroso sur la création d’un environnement 
propice à l’innovation en façonnant une société 
européenne qui comprend la science, la 
technologie et l’ingénierie. Le Conseil travaillera, 
inter alia, sur les thèmes suivants: science et 
société ; la science en tant qu’opportunité; les 
sciences humaines; l’intégration de la science 
dans la vision de l’Europe et au-delà. 
Le 22 avril, le BEPA, l’EAFT (European 
Association of Free Thought) et l’Egale (Égalité 
Laïcité Europe) organisent conjointement un 
séminaire dialogue sur le thème « Ré-enchanter 
l’Europe des citoyens ». Une centaine de 
spécialistes de la Commission européenne et de 
ces deux associations y participeront et auront 
l’occasion de débattre des défis actuels et des 
transformations institutionnelles nécessaires 
pour que l’Europe se rapproche davantage de ses 
citoyens. 
Le 30 avril, Anne Glover, conseillère scientifique 
en chef du Président Barroso, et Robert Madelin, 
le directeur général de la DG CNECT, 
organisent une réunion sur le thème du calcul 
intensif. L’objectif est de réunir des universitaires 
et l’industrie afin d’identifier les défis de ce 
secteur ainsi que les actions concrètes à 
entreprendre pour renforcer ce domaine 
stratégique pour l’Europe. Des personnalités de 
haut niveau viendront éclairer le débat, tel que le 
directeur général de Bull, du European Centre 
for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts, le 
directeur R&T de l’Agence Européenne de 
Défense, et le directeur de la stratégie et des 
programmes du Centre d’Energie Atomique et 
des Energies Alternatives. 
5 BEPA News 
